LegalAware
LegalAware.ai
EMPOWERING LEGAL AWARENESS

Board of Control for Cricket in India vs. Regional Director, Employees' State Insurance Corporation & Anr.

Not available · 2022 INSC 848Decided 18 Aug 2022
Not available
M.R. Shah · Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha

Background

The Regional Director of the Employees' State Insurance (ESI) Corporation held in 2011 that BCCI was covered under the ESI Act (a welfare law funding benefits like sickness and maternity cover for employees) from 2007 onward, and later demanded contribution amounts running into lakhs of rupees. BCCI resisted, arguing it is primarily a sports-promotion body, not a commercial "shop," so the Act should not apply to it. Both the Employees' Insurance Court and the Bombay High Court ruled against BCCI, holding it qualified as a "shop" under a 1978 Maharashtra government notification, so BCCI approached the Supreme Court.

Decision Breakdown

The Supreme Court applied its own earlier ruling in Bangalore Turf Club Ltd. v. Regional Director, ESIC (2014), which held that "shop" under the ESI Act must be read broadly, as any place carrying out systematic, organised commercial activity providing goods or services, not narrowly as a traditional retail store, because the ESI Act is welfare legislation meant to be interpreted liberally in favour of covered employees. Looking at BCCI's actual activities (selling match tickets, providing entertainment, earning income from international tours and the Indian Premier League) the Court held these amounted to systematic commercial activity, regardless of whether BCCI's stated predominant purpose was to promote cricket as a sport. It rejected BCCI's reliance on Income Tax Act precedents as inapplicable since that statute serves a different purpose, and dismissed the special leave petitions, upholding ESI coverage for BCCI's employees.

Lesson Learnt

For welfare legislation like the ESI Act, courts look at an organisation's actual, overall commercial activities (ticket sales, sponsorship, entertainment revenue) rather than its stated primary mission, when deciding whether it must extend statutory benefits to its workers; a non-profit or sports body is not automatically exempt just because its stated object is not "commerce."

Official source (sci.gov.in)View Judgment (PDF)

More rulings in Competition Law

Competition LawSupreme Court of India

Amazon.com NV Investment Holdings LLC v. Competition Commission of India

The Supreme Court allowed Amazon's appeal and set aside both the NCLAT's judgment and the CCI's 2021 order. A central holding was that the proviso to Section 20(1) of the Competition Act bars the CCI from initiating any inquiry into whether a combination has an "appreciable adverse effect on competition" more than one year after the combination takes effect: this is a jurisdictional time-bar, not a mere procedural guideline, and the CCI could not achieve indirectly through Sections 43A/44/45 proceedings what it was time-barred from doing directly. The Court also held that the CCI's powers to penalise for non-disclosure or false statements must be exercised strictly within statutory limits, and that regulatory certainty and predictability, especially for foreign investors, are core objectives of the merger control regime. Any amount recovered from Amazon was ordered refunded with interest.

Decided 27 May 2026Read case
Competition LawSupreme Court of India

Competition Commission of India vs Kerala Film Exhibitors Federation and Others

The Supreme Court held that under Section 48 of the Competition Act, individuals in charge of and responsible for a company or association's affairs at the time of a contravention are deemed liable along with the entity itself, and that no second show-cause notice specifying the proposed punishment is legally required beyond sharing the investigation report to satisfy natural justice. The Court found that the office-bearers had been given adequate notice and opportunity, and rejected the argument that the restrictions violated their constitutional right to form associations, since that right is subject to reasonable restrictions. The Court allowed the Commission's appeal, restored the full findings and penalties against the office-bearers, with the behavioural restriction on their association with the Federation's management to run for two years from December 2025.

Decided 26 Sept 2025Read case
Competition LawSupreme Court of India

Competition Commission of India v. Schott Glass India Pvt. Ltd.

The Supreme Court upheld COMPAT's reversal and dismissed both appeals. It held that competition law must intervene only where there is rigorous, properly tested evidence of actual or likely market harm, not merely because an enterprise is large or holds a dominant position: genuine efficiency and scale should be rewarded, not punished. The Court found the CCI's case rested substantially on statements that were never subjected to cross-examination, and that most converters had in fact grown their business after the period in question, undermining the claim of foreclosure. It affirmed COMPAT's finding that the rebate and supply arrangements did not amount to proven abuse under Section 4, and ordered Kapoor Glass to pay Rs. 5,00,000 in costs to Schott India for the prolonged, ultimately unsubstantiated litigation.

Decided 13 May 2025Read case
Competition LawSupreme Court of India

Independent Sugar Corporation Ltd. v. Girish Sriram Juneja & Ors.

By a 2:1 majority (Justice Hrishikesh Roy, with Justice Sudhanshu Dhulia concurring; Justice S.V.N. Bhatti dissenting on this point), the Court held that the proviso to Section 31(4) of the IBC is mandatory, not directory: where a resolution plan involves a "combination" under the Competition Act, CCI approval must be obtained before, not after, the CoC approves the plan. Since AGI Greenpac's plan was approved by the CoC without the required prior CCI clearance, the majority set aside that approval, nullified all actions taken under the plan, and directed the CoC to reconsider INSCO's plan (and any other plan that did have CCI approval as of the original voting date). In a related but separately decided batch of appeals directly challenging the CCI's own approval order on procedural grounds under Section 29 of the Competition Act (such as the lack of a show-cause notice to HNGIL as target company), the Court found no procedural violation and dismissed those appeals, deferring to the CCI's expert assessment on the substance of the combination.

Decided 29 Jan 2025Read case
Competition LawSupreme Court of India

Kamukayi & Ors. vs Union of India

The Supreme Court held that the FIR, inquest report, post-mortem report, the Railway's own statutory investigation report (accepted by the Divisional Railway Manager), and the son's testimony all consistently established that the deceased had a valid ticket and died after falling from a running train: an "untoward incident" under Section 123(c) of the Railways Act. Relying on its earlier ruling in Union of India v. Rina Devi, the Court reiterated that once a claimant makes out an initial case of being a bona fide passenger, the burden shifts to the Railways to disprove it, which the Railways failed to do here merely by pointing to the absence of a ticket on the body. The Court found the concurrent findings of the Tribunal and High Court "perverse" for ignoring this material, set them aside, and allowed the appeal, awarding compensation of Rs. 4,00,000 with 7% interest from the date of filing (or Rs. 8,00,000 if that figure with interest works out lower, per the amended compensation Rules).

Decided 16 May 2023Read case
Competition LawSupreme Court of India

National Insurance Company Ltd. vs. The Chief Electoral Officer & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 4769 of 2022)

The Supreme Court held that the claim was raised after an unreasonably long delay (seven and a half years) and that if the Chief Electoral Officer believed the claim was valid, it was its own duty to lodge it with the insurer promptly per the MoU's "immediate intimation" clause: its failure to do so could not be used to shift liability onto the insurer. On merits, the Court also held the policy's "external violent and any other visible means" clause, read strictly (as insurance contracts must be), did not cover death by heat stroke, since that is not "accidental means" caused by external violence, relying on the accidental-means vs. accidental-result distinction from Alka Shukla v. LIC. The Division Bench's judgment was set aside and the appeal allowed, though the Court declined to let the money already paid to the widow be recovered back from her.

Decided 8 Feb 2023Read case