In Re: Expeditious Trial of Cases Under Section 138 of N.I. Act 1881
Background
Concerned by a cheque-dishonour dispute that had remained pending for 16 years, the Supreme Court took up on its own motion the massive nationwide backlog of cases under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (cheque bounce cases): about 35.16 lakh pending as of end-2019 out of 2.31 crore total pending criminal cases. The Court appointed amici curiae, sought responses from the Union, High Courts, state police chiefs, the RBI and the Indian Banks' Association, and examined seven major causes of delay identified in the amici's preliminary report, including problems with service of summons, inconsistent conversion of summary trials to summons trials, and unclear inquiry requirements.
Decision Breakdown
The Court issued a series of practical directions and interim conclusions: High Courts should direct Magistrates to record reasons before converting a summary trial into a summons trial; an inquiry under Section 202 CrPC is mandatory before issuing process against an accused residing outside the court's jurisdiction, and such inquiry can be conducted on affidavit evidence rather than requiring witnesses to be examined in person; it recommended a legislative amendment to allow trying more than three same-type Section 138 offences together in one trial (overriding the normal CrPC cap); it directed that service of summons in one complaint arising from a transaction be treated as deemed service for all related complaints; and it reaffirmed that trial courts have no inherent power to review or recall an order issuing summons (confirming Adalat Prasad and Subramanium Sethuraman), clarifying that an earlier ruling (Meters and Instruments) wrongly held otherwise. A retired judge-led committee was constituted to examine remaining systemic issues, including possible legislative amendments, and the matter was referred onward to a three-judge bench.
Lesson Learnt
This order is a reminder that the Supreme Court can use its suo motu and supervisory powers to address systemic delays in the justice system, not just decide individual disputes, and that procedural safeguards like mandatory inquiries before summoning an out-of-jurisdiction accused, or the limits on a trial court's power to recall its own orders, exist to balance speedy disposal of cheque-bounce cases with fairness to the accused.