Kuntegowda v. Thurubaiah
Background
The complainant had given the accused a hand loan of Rs. 4,50,000 in December 2010 to buy a house site, to be repaid within a year with 16% interest. The accused issued a cheque for the amount in 2013, which bounced for insufficient funds, and after a demand notice went unanswered, the complainant filed a Section 138 NI Act complaint. Both the trial court and the sessions court (in appeal) convicted the accused, but the Karnataka High Court, exercising its revisional jurisdiction, went into the merits of the evidence afresh and acquitted him, chiefly reasoning that the complainant had not adequately shown his financial capacity to advance such a large, interest-free-sounding loan.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court restored the conviction, holding first on the merits that the complainant had in fact discharged his burden: two witnesses corroborated that they had lent him money which he then advanced to the accused, the accused's signature on the cheque was admitted (triggering the presumption under Section 139 of the NI Act that it was issued to discharge a liability), and the accused had failed to raise or prove any defence of financial incapacity, either in his reply to the demand notice or through evidence at trial. More fundamentally, the Court held that the High Court had exceeded the scope of its revisional jurisdiction by re-appreciating evidence and substituting its own view for the concurrent factual findings of two courts below, contrary to settled law that revisional courts may interfere only where there is perversity, gross error, or a glaring miscarriage of justice: none of which the High Court had identified. The Supreme Court set aside the High Court's order and restored the trial court and sessions court judgments.
Lesson Learnt
A High Court's revisional jurisdiction over a criminal conviction is narrow and supervisory, not a second appeal. It cannot re-weigh evidence and overturn concurrent findings of guilt unless there is a clear, glaring error or perversity on the record; and in cheque-bounce cases, once the signature on the cheque is admitted, the burden shifts to the accused to actively disprove the presumed underlying debt, not merely raise doubts about it.