Neeraj Sharma vs. The State of Chhattisgarh
Background
The appellants took an 18-year-old college student, whom they knew, on a motorcycle ride at night, tried to strangle him with a clutch wire, and, believing him dead, poured petrol on him and set him on fire after robbing him of cash and his phone. He survived with 45-48% burns and had to have a leg amputated, and was rescued by strangers. Both the trial court and the Chhattisgarh High Court convicted the two accused under Section 364A IPC (kidnapping for ransom, punishable by death or life imprisonment) along with attempt to murder and robbery charges, relying partly on a claim that the victim's father had received a ransom demand call.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court held that the evidence of attempted murder and robbery was solid and beyond reasonable doubt, particularly given the victim's own detailed and consistent account as an injured witness. However, it found the Section 364A (ransom) conviction unsustainable: the victim's own courtroom testimony never mentioned any ransom demand, the alleged ransom-demanding phone call was attributed to a co-accused who had already been acquitted at trial, and no evidence under Section 65 of the Evidence Act was placed to substantiate the call. The Court also held that a supplementary police statement recorded two months later could not be treated as a "dying declaration" simply because it mentioned ransom: the victim had survived, so no dying declaration could exist. The Section 364A conviction was therefore converted to the lesser offence of Section 364 IPC (abduction to murder), with sentences reduced to 10 years' rigorous imprisonment, while the convictions for attempt to murder and robbery were affirmed. The Court also enhanced victim compensation to Rs. 5 lakh under Section 357A CrPC.
Lesson Learnt
A conviction for the aggravated offence of kidnapping-for-ransom requires the prosecution to actually prove a ransom demand with real evidence: a bare, uncorroborated assertion by a family member, especially one attributed to an already-acquitted co-accused, is not enough, and a statement by a survivor can never be treated as a "dying declaration."