Rajan v. The Home Secretary, Home Department of Tamil Nadu
Background
The petitioner, convicted in 1988 for dacoity and the murder of three persons (among other offences) and sentenced to life imprisonment on multiple counts plus a term under the Arms Act, had by 2018 spent over 30 years in actual custody (over 36 years with remission). His 2010 representation for premature release had been rejected by the State's Advisory Board, and a fresh representation made in February 2018 went unanswered, prompting him to file a writ petition under Article 32 seeking either outright release or a declaration that part of his sentence (under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act, since struck down as unconstitutional in a separate Supreme Court ruling) was void.
Decision Breakdown
The Court agreed that the conviction under Section 27(3) of the Arms Act could no longer be reckoned since that provision had been declared unconstitutional, and also held, relying on Constitution Bench precedent, that sentences for offences already fully served concurrently (dacoity and the remaining Arms Act offence) could not be counted either, leaving only the multiple life sentences under Sections 302 and 307 IPC relevant to any remission decision. However, it held that granting or refusing remission/premature release is the prerogative of the appropriate Government under Sections 432-433 CrPC, not something a court can simply order, and since the petitioner now qualified for consideration only on the life-sentence counts, his earlier 2010 rejection could not be allowed to block a fresh, timely decision on his 2018 representation. It disposed of the petition by directing the State to process the February 2018 representation on its own merits within four months, without being influenced by the earlier rejection, and clarified that consultation with the Central Government was unnecessary.
Lesson Learnt
Courts generally will not order a prisoner's premature release directly, since that discretion belongs to the government under the Code of Criminal Procedure; but courts can require the government to actually decide a long-pending representation promptly and on its true, updated merits rather than let it languish or be dismissed on stale grounds.