Saroj Pandey v. State (Govt. of NCT of Delhi) & Ors.
Background
The appellant, a Director of Projtech Engineering Private Limited, was summoned along with the company in a cheque-bounce complaint under Sections 138 and 142 of the Negotiable Instruments Act after three company cheques totaling Rs. 50 lakhs were dishonoured. Her revision petition against the summoning order was dismissed by the Additional Sessions Judge on the ground that, as a signatory to a Board Resolution, she was involved in the company's day-to-day management. The Delhi High Court then declined to quash the summons under its inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC, holding that having already pursued an unsuccessful revision on the same grounds, her Section 482 petition was confined to a narrower jurisdiction. She appealed to the Supreme Court.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's reasoning, that a Section 482 CrPC petition is barred or narrowly circumscribed merely because a revision petition on the same grounds had already been dismissed, was legally incorrect, relying on the three-judge bench decision in Krishnan v. Krishnaveni and later precedents (Dhariwal Tobacco Products, Prabhu Chawla) which establish that the inherent power of the High Court under Section 482 is a separate, statutorily-saved power that survives even where revisional remedies are barred or already exhausted. Applying this, and having reviewed whether the appellant was genuinely shown to be in charge of the company's day-to-day affairs, the Court found fault with the High Court's approach and set aside its judgment. The proceedings against the appellant were accordingly quashed, with the Court clarifying that this ruling concerned only her case and would not affect the trial of the co-accused.
Lesson Learnt
Filing (and losing) a criminal revision petition does not by itself bar a person from separately invoking the High Court's inherent powers under Section 482 CrPC to quash proceedings: the two remedies are legally distinct. Directors of a company are not automatically liable under the NI Act merely for signing a board resolution; courts must specifically examine whether they were actually in charge of and responsible for the company's day-to-day business.