State of Gujarat v. Jayrajbhai Punjabhai Varu
Background
The respondent's wife died of 90% burn injuries in 2003. Before dying, she gave two separate dying declarations, one to a police officer and one to the Executive Magistrate, in both of which she stated an unknown outsider had poured kerosene on her and set her on fire, and that she had no complaint against her husband or in-laws. Despite this, the Trial Court convicted the husband of murder based mainly on an oral account the deceased's father (PW-1) claimed she gave him separately, implicating the husband; the father's account was never corroborated and surfaced only after the cremation. The High Court acquitted the husband, and the State appealed to the Supreme Court.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court held that the two formally recorded dying declarations were mutually consistent and did not implicate the husband, while the father's oral account was inherently more susceptible to influence, afterthought, or tutoring, and could not safely override consistent, formally-recorded declarations. The Court reiterated settled principles on dying declarations: they must be scrutinised with a "microscopic eye" for voluntariness and truthfulness, can form the sole basis of conviction only where they inspire full confidence, and where multiple declarations exist, the more consistent and reliable one should be accepted: here favouring the accused. Applying the rule that where two views are reasonably possible, the one favourable to the accused must be adopted, the Court found no reason to disturb the High Court's acquittal and dismissed the State's appeal.
Lesson Learnt
Courts give primacy to properly and promptly recorded dying declarations (especially before an independent Magistrate) over a later, uncorroborated oral account surfacing from an interested relative; a conviction cannot rest on the weaker, more suspect version when a formally recorded and consistent declaration points the other way.