State of M.P. v. Ashok & Others
Background
In 1989, a man named Tikaram was stopped on his bicycle, had petrol poured on him, and was set on fire by two named individuals, while several other people, including the respondents in this case, allegedly surrounded him, shouted that he should be beaten and not allowed to escape, and in some instances actively participated (one threw a burning tyre at him, another threw a sword). Tikaram survived long enough to give two separate dying declarations naming all the attackers before he died the next day. The trial court convicted everyone involved, but the High Court, while upholding the conviction of the two who actually poured the petrol and lit the match, acquitted the respondents on the theory that they had only arrived at the scene after the attack began and so could not be said to share the common object of an unlawful assembly.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court held that the High Court's finding that the respondents arrived only after the offence was complete was directly contradicted by the record, both of Tikaram's consistent dying declarations, corroborated by an independent eyewitness and the post-mortem report (which showed a sword injury matching the eyewitness account), described the respondents as encircling Tikaram while he burned and actively preventing his escape, with some physically joining the assault. The Court emphasised that while appellate courts must be cautious about overturning acquittals, this was a case where the High Court's conclusion was plainly against the weight of the evidence. It allowed the State's appeals, set aside the acquittal, and restored the trial court's conviction and life sentences against the respondents, directing that they be taken into custody immediately.
Lesson Learnt
A dying declaration, when consistent, corroborated by independent witnesses, and supported by physical/medical evidence, can be powerful enough to establish that bystanders who surround and trap a victim, even without personally lighting the fire, share criminal responsibility as members of an unlawful assembly with a common murderous object.