Ultra Tech Cement Ltd. v. Rakesh Kumar Singh & Anr.
Background
Ultra Tech Cement had filed a criminal complaint under Section 138 of the Negotiable Instruments Act (cheque dishonour) against Rakesh Kumar Singh before the Metropolitan Magistrate's Court in Calcutta back in 2007. The company filed its pre-summoning affidavit in February 2007, the accused was examined in 2008, and the case had proceeded through several stages of recording evidence over subsequent years. In the meantime, a three-judge Bench of the Supreme Court in Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod vs. State of Maharashtra (2014) changed the law on where such cheque-bounce complaints could be filed, holding they should ordinarily be filed only where the cheque was dishonoured, but it carved out a protective exception for cases where evidence had already started being recorded at the post-summoning stage before that 2014 ruling. The question in this appeal was whether Ultra Tech's complaint, pending in Calcutta, fell within that protected exception.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court examined the actual procedural history of the complaint and found that the accused had been examined under Section 251 CrPC, pleaded not guilty, and that the complainant had filed its affidavit to be treated as its examination-in-chief (PW-1's statement), with the matter then repeatedly listed for cross-examination of that witness over several years. This meant that recording of evidence at the post-summoning stage, as contemplated by Section 145(2) of the Negotiable Instruments Act, had indeed commenced before the Dashrath Rupsingh Rathod judgment was delivered on 1 August 2014. Applying the exception carved out in that earlier three-judge ruling, the Court held that the Calcutta Magistrate's Court retained jurisdiction and was not required to return the complaint for refiling at the place of cheque dishonour. The appeal was accordingly allowed, and the Magistrate was directed to proceed with the case.
Lesson Learnt
When a later Supreme Court ruling changes the rules on where a case can be filed, it does not automatically uproot every pending case: proceedings that had already reached a specified procedural stage (here, the start of evidence recording) before the new ruling are protected and can continue where they are; the practical effect depends on exactly how far the case had progressed at the time the law changed.