Yash Tuteja vs. Union of India
Background
The Enforcement Directorate filed a money-laundering complaint under Section 44(1)(b) of the PMLA against several individuals, based on alleged offences under the Income Tax Act and certain sections of the IPC (conspiracy, and offences relating to false statements and disobeying summons). The petitioners challenged the complaint, arguing that none of the underlying offences it relied on were actually "scheduled offences" under the PMLA: a essential legal precondition for a money-laundering case to exist at all.
Decision Breakdown
Relying on its own recent ruling in Pavana Dibbur v. Directorate of Enforcement, the Supreme Court held that the existence of a "scheduled offence" is a mandatory precondition for there to be any "proceeds of crime," which in turn is essential for an offence under Section 3 of the PMLA. Since the only IPC offence that could potentially qualify (criminal conspiracy under Section 120-B) becomes a scheduled offence only if the conspiracy is to commit an offence that is itself listed in the PMLA's Schedule, which was not alleged here, none of the offences relied on in the complaint were scheduled offences. As a result, there could be no "proceeds of crime" and no valid money-laundering offence, so the complaint against two of the petitioners was quashed outright, while petitions by parties not even named as accused were disposed of as unnecessary. The Court kept an earlier interim order alive briefly and left open the question of any fresh proceedings the ED indicated it might bring based on a different underlying case.
Lesson Learnt
A money-laundering prosecution under the PMLA cannot stand unless it is genuinely rooted in one of the specific "scheduled offences" listed in the Act: merely alleging a general conspiracy or unrelated offences is not enough to trigger the law.