Disha Panchal & Ors. v. Union of India & Ors. (with connected writ petitions)

Writ Petition (Civil) · 2018 INSC 553Decided 13 Jun 2018
Writ Petition (Civil) No. 551 of 2018
Justice Uday Umesh Lalit · Justice Deepak Gupta

Background

Thousands of candidates taking the 2018 Common Law Admission Test (CLAT), a single online entrance exam for 19 national law universities, experienced software crashes, frozen screens, login failures, and other technical glitches that cost many of them valuable exam time. Several candidates petitioned the Supreme Court (and various High Courts) seeking cancellation of the entire test and a fresh exam.

Decision Breakdown

The Court had already directed constitution of a Grievance Redressal Committee (headed by a retired judge) to audit login/logout data for all affected candidates. Based on that committee's report covering 4,690 affected candidates out of 54,464 total test-takers, the Court rejected the demand to cancel and re-conduct the entire exam as unfair to the large majority of unaffected candidates, and instead accepted a statistical "normalization formula" to award compensatory marks to candidates who lost time, based on each candidate's own answering efficiency. The Court also directed the Ministry of Human Resources Development to set up a committee to investigate the examination body's failures and prevent recurrence, and disposed of all the writ petitions with detailed implementation directions.

Lesson Learnt

When a technical failure disrupts a mass examination, courts will generally prefer a proportionate, data-driven remedy (like a scoring adjustment for affected candidates) over invalidating the entire process for everyone, since wholesale cancellation can cause greater unfairness to unaffected candidates.

Education LawDelhi High Court

Ms. Ashi Agarwal vs. Union of India & Ors.

The High Court dismissed the writ petition. It held that the petitioner had not shown a legally sustainable basis for deviating from the prescribed eligibility criteria. The disputed questions about the JEE (Main) evaluation and her absence from Session II could not be conclusively decided in writ proceedings. Sympathy or loss of an academic year could not substitute for the eligibility conditions, and creating a supernumerary seat would have reopened a concluded admission cycle. The Court noted that an earlier interim-relief order on the same issue had already attained finality before the Supreme Court.

Decided 1 Oct 2026Read case
Education LawDelhi High Court

Union of India & Ors. vs. Himanshi & 34 Ors.

The High Court found the Committee's report against Himanshi to be full of tentative, hedged language ("seems," "probably," "appears") rather than firm findings, with no CCTV footage of her at all and, most critically, the terminal she was shifted to did not even match the government's own list of "compromised" terminals for that exam venue, directly contradicting the central premise of the case against her. Given this glaring internal inconsistency, along with discrepancies between the Committee's report and the SSC's own court filings about how many questions she answered on each terminal, the Court held the cancellation and 7-year debarment were not justified on the facts and dismissed the Union's appeal, while making clear this ruling did not decide the separate cases of the other 34 candidates.

Decided 24 Sept 2026Read case
Education LawDelhi High Court

Aashiya vs. National Medical Commission through its Secretary & Ors. and connected matters

The Court held that under the applicable National Medical Commission guidelines and the Rights of Persons with Disabilities Act, 2016, a candidate's UDID card is the primary evidence of the existence, nature, and extent of disability, and the Medical Assessment Boards' role is confined to assessing "functional competency" (the ability to complete the MBBS course): they have no power to independently re-quantify or reduce the disability percentage recorded on the UDID card. Since both boards had actually found the petitioner functionally capable of pursuing MBBS, yet used their own reduced disability percentage to deny her PwBD reservation, the Court set aside both boards' certificates and directed that she be allowed to participate in the next available round of NEET counselling under the PwBD category, based on her UDID-recorded disability.

Decided 24 Sept 2026Read case
Education LawDelhi High Court

Union of India & Ors vs. Jatin

The Court held that since the entire case against Jatin rested solely on the CCTV footage, denying him any access to or sight of that footage before cancelling his candidature caused him clear, "manifest prejudice": this was not a mere technical lapse but went to the heart of his ability to defend himself. Distinguishing a Supreme Court ruling that not every missing document invalidates a disciplinary proceeding (only ones that cause real prejudice), the Court found this was exactly the kind of case where genuine prejudice existed, since there was no other evidence at all. It upheld the Tribunal's decision and dismissed the SSC's petition, remarking that conducting a proper inquiry or simply sharing the footage could have avoided the litigation entirely.

Decided 16 Sept 2026Read case
Education LawDelhi High Court

Prabhat Shahi vs. National Institute of Open Schooling (NIOS)

The Court found that NIOS's current rules (2026) impose no time limit for correcting a genuine date-of-birth error, so the earlier limitation-based rejection could no longer stand. Relying on the Supreme Court's holding that an examination board cannot let administrative convenience override a citizen's right to accurate identity records, and noting that Shahi's Aadhaar, passport, driving licence, PAN card and school records all uniformly showed 1990, the Court found this a genuine clerical error rather than any attempt at fraud. It directed NIOS to correct the date of birth to 10.02.1990 and issue fresh certificates.

Decided 16 Sept 2026Read case
Education LawDelhi High Court

Vijeta vs. Union of India and Ors.

The Court rejected the first argument, noting the referenced documents were freely available on the university's website and their non-attachment did not invalidate the notice. On the second and more substantial point, the Court held that a student being a member of a political party's youth/student wing does not, by itself, make that student "associated" with the political party for purposes of the Lyngdoh rule: what the rule actually forbids is participation in the election process by people who are not genuine students, or direct involvement of an actual registered political party. However, the Court noted that one candidate's campaign poster had displayed an actual political party's name and official election symbol, which the Court found genuinely problematic and directed university authorities to actively prevent and check such prohibited conduct going forward.

Decided 16 Sept 2026Read case