Durgabai Deshmukh Memorial Sr. Sec. School & Anr. v. J.A.J. Vasu Sena & Anr.

Civil Appeal · 2019 INSC 937Decided 21 Aug 2019
Civil Appeal No. 5926 of 2019
Dr. Justice D.Y. Chandrachud · Justice Aniruddha Bose

Background

J.A.J. Vasu Sena was appointed on probation as a PGT (English) teacher at a Delhi minority school in 2008 for one year. Her probation was extended twice and she continued as a probationer for nearly five years before the school discharged her from service in 2013 without ever issuing an order confirming her in the post. She challenged her discharge, and the Delhi High Court's Division Bench held that under the applicable service rules she stood "deemed confirmed" simply because she had been kept on beyond the maximum permissible probation period, and ordered her reinstatement.

Decision Breakdown

The Supreme Court found that the High Court had relied on an outdated, superseded text of the governing rule; correctly read, the rule capped the total permissible probation period at two years (one year plus one further year's extension), a limit that applies to minority institutions too. However, the Court held there is no automatic "deemed confirmation" merely from being kept on beyond that period: the rule required a specific, affirmative act of confirmation by the school, which was never done, so the teacher did not become a confirmed employee by the mere passage of time. Despite this, the Court used its special constitutional power under Article 142 to award her a one-time payment of Rs 5,00,000, recognising that she had given five years of service while the school itself had flouted the probation-period cap. The appeal was partly allowed.

Lesson Learnt

Being kept on "probation" well past the period a rule allows does not, by itself, make a job permanent: confirmation usually requires an actual order from the employer, not just the passage of time. Courts can still step in to compensate an employee for an employer's prolonged rule violation, even where no automatic right to permanent employment exists.

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