Sheela Gehlot v. Mohini Hardayal Singh and Others

Civil Appeal · 2026 INSC 863Decided 14 Aug 2026
Civil Appeal No. 182 of 2016, with Civil Appeal No. 190 of 2016 (Punjab & Sind Bank v. Mohini Hardayal Singh & Ors.) and Civil Appeal No. 191 of 2016 (Jagminder Singh v. Punjab & Sind Bank & Ors.)
Justice Pamidighantam Sri Narasimha · Justice Alok Aradhe

Background

A company owned by the husband of Mohini Hardayal Singh had defaulted on bank loans; Punjab & Sind Bank obtained a compromise decree in 1991, and after further defaults, pursued execution: eventually against the family's Delhi residential property (which had been offered only as collateral, then released, though personal liability continued). After the judgment-debtor's death, execution proceedings were transferred to the Debts Recovery Tribunal (DRT), the Delhi property was auctioned in 2006 to Sheela Gehlot, and the sale was confirmed. Mohini Hardayal Singh and her children challenged the sale, claiming they were never properly served notice of execution and that the property was their exempt "main residential house." The High Court set aside the appellate tribunal's order and sent the matter back for a fresh inquiry into these claims.

Decision Breakdown

The Supreme Court held that once execution transferred from the ordinary civil court to the DRT under the special 1993 Recovery of Debts Act, the applicable procedure became the Income Tax Act's Second Schedule (via Section 29 of the 1993 Act), not the Civil Procedure Code's Order XXI Rule 22, so the alleged lack of notice under the Code was irrelevant. While notice under the Second Schedule's Rule 2 was indeed not served, the family already had actual knowledge of the execution (having filed their own applications referencing it) and suffered no "substantial injury," so the sale could not be invalidated on that ground, especially as they never even sought the specific remedy provided for such a defect. On the exemption claim, the Court held Section 60(1)(ccc)'s protection for a "main residential house" is personal to the judgment-debtor himself and does not extend to his legal heirs, and in any case the claim was never properly raised with a factual foundation at the right stage. The High Court's order remitting the matter was therefore set aside; the appeals of the auction-purchaser and the bank were allowed, and the son's appeal was dismissed.

Lesson Learnt

When a legal right to object exists (whether over lack of notice or a claimed exemption), it must be raised at the earliest proper stage with real evidence. Courts will not indulge decades-late objections, especially where the objecting party had actual knowledge of the proceedings all along and suffered no real prejudice.

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