Indore Development Authority vs. Burhani Grih Nirman Sahakari Sanstha Maryadit Sneh Nagar & Ors. (Civil Appeal No. 5071 of 2022, with 32 connected appeals)
Background
In 1981 the Indore Development Authority (IDA) declared its intention to frame "Scheme No. 97," a residential town-development scheme, and finally published it in 1984. When negotiations with landowners for the land failed, the State began compulsory acquisition proceedings under the Land Acquisition Act, 1894, culminating in an award in 1991. Affected landowners went to the Madhya Pradesh High Court, arguing the scheme had lapsed for non-implementation within three years, that objections under Section 5-A had not been decided by a properly empowered authority, and that releasing large chunks of land to some owners while acquiring others' land was discriminatory. Both the Single Judge and the Division Bench ruled for the landowners, quashing the scheme and the acquisition; the IDA appealed to the Supreme Court.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court reversed the High Court and upheld the scheme and acquisition. It held that "commence implementation" in Section 54 of the Adhiniyam does not require the scheme to be fully completed within three years, only that substantial steps be taken, and the IDA had taken many concrete steps (negotiations, seeking NOCs, and finally requesting acquisition) within the three-year window. On delegation, it held the State's 1985 order empowering the Collector and Commissioner to act under Sections 4, 5, 6 and 17 of the 1894 Act implicitly covered Section 5-A objections as well, since a Section 6 declaration cannot be issued without first deciding those objections. On the discrimination point, the Court found the release of some parcels (to housing societies with pre-existing exemptions, agricultural/park land, or land freed on individual 5-A objections) had a rational basis and did not destroy the integrity of the overall scheme.
Lesson Learnt
A statutory scheme does not automatically lapse merely because it isn't fully completed within a legislated deadline, taking genuine, substantial steps toward implementation is enough to keep it alive. Similarly, releasing some acquired land for valid, case-specific reasons does not by itself make continued acquisition of the rest of the land unconstitutionally discriminatory.