Amina Bi Kaskar (D) Thr. Lr. v. Union of India

Civil Appeal · 2018 INSC 381Decided 20 Apr 2018
Civil Appeal No. 4252 of 2018
Justice R.K. Agrawal · Justice Abhay Manohar Sapre

Background

The Competent Authority under SAFEMA ordered forfeiture of certain properties belonging to the appellants in 1998. The appellants appealed to the Appellate Tribunal for Forfeited Property, but did so 81 days after being served the order, well beyond the 45-day limitation period and even beyond the outer 60-day limit up to which delay could be condoned. The Tribunal dismissed the appeals as time-barred, and both the High Court's Single Judge and Division Bench upheld that dismissal.

Decision Breakdown

The Supreme Court examined the appellants' own admission in their Tribunal filings that they had received the forfeiture order on 29-30 July 1998, which fixed the start of the limitation period. Since the appeal was filed on the 81st day, beyond the Tribunal's power to condone delay (capped at 60 days under SAFEMA), the Court held the question of whether service of the order was technically proper was irrelevant once actual knowledge was admitted. The Court found this was a concurrent finding of fact by the Tribunal and both levels of the High Court, which was neither illegal nor perverse, and therefore declined to interfere. The appeals were dismissed.

Lesson Learnt

Statutory limitation periods for appeals, especially where the law fixes an outer limit beyond which delay cannot be condoned at all, are strictly enforced, once a person admits to having actual knowledge of an order, technical objections about the manner of its service will not revive a time-barred appeal.

Civil ProcedureDelhi High Court

Smt Nisha Sharma vs. M/S Intec Capital Limited and Ors

The Court held that because the property had already been specifically identified in the pending execution case before the transfer happened, the transfer remained subject to the execution proceedings under Section 52 of the Transfer of Property Act, and didn't place the share beyond the lender's reach. It also found the appellant couldn't reopen the same ownership argument a second time, since an identical objection had already been rejected earlier and not appealed, and that the surrounding facts (payment timing, continued family occupation, auction bought by a relative) suggested the transfer was intended to defeat the lender's claim. The appeal was dismissed and the auction sale of the guarantor's half-share was upheld.

Decided 6 Oct 2026Read case
Civil ProcedureDelhi High Court

Shakeel Qureshi & Ors. vs. Rashid Qureshi & Ors.

The Court held that since the plaintiffs' own claims were entirely built on the MoU, the MoU's exclusionary jurisdiction clause (Clause 10, conferring jurisdiction only on Bareilly courts) had to be examined and applied. It rejected the plaintiffs' "approbate and reprobate" argument (that defendants couldn't rely on the MoU in other suits yet deny Delhi's jurisdiction here), finding the defendants' conduct in earlier, differently-framed suits didn't amount to such inconsistency. The plaint was returned under Order VII Rule 10 CPC to be filed before a court of competent jurisdiction at Bareilly, without any opinion expressed on the merits of the fraud/breach allegations.

Decided 6 Oct 2026Read case
Civil ProcedureDelhi High Court

M/S Siddhivinayak Coal Carriers Pvt. Ltd. vs. Coal India Limited & Ors.

The Division Bench held that an appeal under Section 13 of the Commercial Courts Act, 2015 only lies against orders specifically listed in Order XLIII of the CPC or Section 37 of the Arbitration Act, relying on Supreme Court authority (Kandla Export Corporation) confirming this is an exhaustive, not illustrative, list. Since an order converting a summary suit into a regular suit isn't among the orders listed in Order XLIII, the appeal was dismissed as not maintainable.

Decided 6 Oct 2026Read case
Civil ProcedureDelhi High Court

Ramesh vs. Smt. Geeta

The High Court agreed with the lower courts that the document recorded only a loan transaction, not a sale, so the appellant's argument about an illegal/void sale (under Section 23 of the Contract Act) didn't apply. Since the respondent was relying on her own allotment rights rather than enforcing the disputed document, and the appeal really just disputed how the evidence had been weighed, no substantial legal question arose, and the second appeal was dismissed.

Decided 6 Oct 2026Read case
Civil ProcedureDelhi High Court

Pooja Singh vs. Gulab Devi Prasad Singh

While the appeal was pending, the parties settled the matter in execution proceedings for Rs. 9,50,000, and part of that settlement had already been acted upon. Rs. 1,98,000 had been paid to the Plaintiff, and the balance of Rs. 7,52,000 had been deposited in the High Court. The Court held that the Defendant could not go back on a settlement that had been acted upon, and that no monetary dispute remained for adjudication. The Court directed that the deposited balance be released to the Plaintiff and disposed of the appeal in terms of the settlement.

Decided 5 Oct 2026Read case
Civil ProcedureDelhi High Court

Richmond Global School vs. Shri Vijay Kumar Jain

The Court considered the legal meaning of "sufficient cause", explaining that it requires the party to show that it was not negligent or lacking in bona fides, and that the facts must support the exercise of discretion judiciously. Finding that the District Judge's view was correct, the High Court held that the appeal was devoid of merit and dismissed it, with no order as to costs.

Decided 5 Oct 2026Read case