Arulmighu Nellukadai Mariamman Tirukkoil v. Tamilarasi (Dead) By LRs.
Background
A temple (the appellant) filed a civil suit for eviction against the respondent, and won both at the trial court and in the first appeal. The respondent then filed a second appeal before the Madras High Court, which allowed the appeal and dismissed the temple's suit, but only framed the "substantial questions of law" required for a second appeal at the time of delivering its final judgment, rather than at the admission stage as the Code of Civil Procedure requires. The temple appealed to the Supreme Court, arguing this procedure was legally improper regardless of which side the High Court ultimately favoured.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court held that Section 100 of the Code of Civil Procedure mandates that a High Court must formulate the substantial question(s) of law at the admission stage (or, under the proviso to Section 100(5), with recorded reasons if an additional question arises later): it cannot decide a second appeal on questions framed for the first time in the final judgment itself, since this denies the respondent the opportunity under Section 100(5) to object that the framed question does not actually arise. Relying on its own recent precedent (Surat Singh v. Siri Bhagwan), the Court found the Madras High Court's second-appeal judgment could not be sustained for failing to follow this mandatory procedure. It allowed the appeal, set aside the High Court's judgment, and remanded the case for the second appeal to be decided afresh, properly framing substantial questions of law first, while expressly declining to express any opinion on the merits of the underlying eviction dispute, and asking the High Court to decide the matter expeditiously within six months given its age.
Lesson Learnt
In a second appeal, a High Court must formulate the substantial question(s) of law at the admission stage (not retroactively while writing the final judgment), failing to follow this mandatory procedure under Section 100 CPC can get even a final second-appeal judgment set aside on procedural grounds alone, regardless of which party it favoured on the merits.