Narayan v. Babasaheb & Ors.
Background
After the family's father died leaving ancestral property, the mother (as natural guardian) sold the property to the appellant in 1982 and 1988 while some of her children were still minors. The children later filed a partition suit in 1989 seeking to set aside the sale deeds, alleging the sales were made without legal necessity and that one sale deed falsely showed a then-major plaintiff as a minor. The Supreme Court, when granting leave, had confined the appeal strictly to one legal question: whether the 1989 suit challenging the 1982 sale deed was filed within the limitation period.
Decision Breakdown
The Court held that a suit by a former minor to set aside a transfer of immovable property made by his or her guardian in violation of Section 8 of the Hindu Minority and Guardianship Act, 1956 is governed specifically by Article 60 of the Limitation Act (three years from attaining majority), not by the more general Articles 109, 110 or 113 relied on by the lower courts. Applying Section 7 of the Limitation Act (which addresses when time begins to run for multiple joint plaintiffs), the Court found that since none of the adult co-plaintiffs qualified as a "manager" capable of giving a discharge on behalf of the others, time did not start running until the youngest/relevant plaintiff attained majority, making the 1989 suit timely. Having found the suit within limitation on the sole question referred to it, the Court held the appeal devoid of merit and dismissed it, affirming the High Court's judgment, without costs.
Lesson Learnt
When a minor's guardian sells inherited property without legal necessity, the minor (after attaining majority) has a specific three-year limitation window under Article 60 of the Limitation Act to challenge that sale, and when a suit has multiple co-plaintiffs, that clock does not start running against all of them until one of them is actually legally capable of giving a valid discharge on the whole group's behalf.