Rohit Chaturvedi v. State of Uttarakhand & Ors.
Background
The petitioner was convicted of murder (along with co-accused, including the well-known case involving Amarmani Tripathi) and sentenced to life imprisonment in 2007, with his conviction affirmed up to the Supreme Court by 2013. After serving over 22 years, he sought premature release; the State of Uttarakhand recommended his release, but the Union of India's Ministry of Home Affairs rejected it on the ground that his case, having been investigated by the CBI, fell within a prohibited category under Uttarakhand's remission policy. The Supreme Court had earlier clarified that since the crime occurred in Uttar Pradesh (though the trial was transferred to Uttarakhand for a fair trial), it was actually Uttar Pradesh's remission policy that should govern his case, but bureaucratic delay and inaction followed, prompting the petitioner to approach the Court again by writ petition.
Decision Breakdown
The Supreme Court held that the Ministry of Home Affairs' rejection letter was arbitrary and non-speaking (lacking proper reasons), and quashed it. It relied on several factors: the State Government itself had recommended premature release after assessing the petitioner's good conduct in custody; he had already served over 22 years, well beyond the norm; and a co-accused in the very same case (Amarmani Tripathi) had already been granted premature release after serving a shorter period, and no cogent reason was given for treating the petitioner differently: a violation of the constitutional guarantee against arbitrary, unequal treatment. The Court also invoked the reformative theory of punishment, holding that the object of a sentence is rehabilitation, not mere retribution, and granted the petitioner's premature release/remission, dispensing with any need for him to surrender since he was already on interim bail.
Lesson Learnt
A government's refusal to grant premature release/remission to a long-serving life convict must be a reasoned, non-arbitrary decision, and denying parity to a convict when a co-accused in the identical case has already been released on similar facts, without clear distinguishing reasons, will not survive judicial scrutiny; good conduct in custody and a State Government's own recommendation carry significant weight in such decisions.