CA Ramchandra Dallaram Choudhary v. Adani Infrastructure and Developers Private Limited
Background
The liquidator of a corporate debtor challenged an NCLAT order dated 8 December 2025 by filing an appeal under Section 62 of the Insolvency and Bankruptcy Code, 2016. The appeal was filed 7 days beyond the 45-day limitation period (within the 15-day grace period), but was marked defective by the Registry, and after curing the defects it was re-filed with a further 82-day delay. The liquidator sought condonation of both delays, partly relying on an earlier order where the Supreme Court had condoned a re-filing delay in a related IBC matter involving the same appellant.
Decision Breakdown
The Court held that Section 62 IBC allows only 45 days to file an appeal, extendable by a maximum grace period of 15 days (60 days total), and that this outer limit is a strict jurisdictional bar beyond which the Court has no power to condone delay. It clarified that curing defects in a defectively-filed appeal is permitted only within 28 days of the Registry's notification; once that 28-day window lapses, there is no scope for further "re-filing delay" applications because the appeal itself becomes time-barred. The Court distinguished the appellant's reliance on an earlier order (which had condoned delay in a related Section 61 appeal before the NCLAT) as confined to its own facts and not a precedent for repeated indulgence. Finding the explanations for both delays unconvincing and the statutory bar insurmountable, the Court dismissed the appeal as time-barred and dismissed all connected applications.
Lesson Learnt
Under the IBC, deadlines for approaching appellate forums are treated as strict and largely non-negotiable. Once the statutory outer limit (45 days plus a 15-day grace period, and 28 days to cure defects) lapses, courts generally lack the power to excuse the delay, regardless of the reasons offered. Litigants relying on the IBC's appellate remedies must act well within these fixed windows, since one favourable condonation order in an earlier round of litigation does not carry forward as a precedent for future delays.